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I. ADMINISTRATION, ANCIENT & MODERN
The ﬁrst thing to acknowledge about administration is that administration
is coincident with governance. Far from being a modern invention or some
kind of radical departure from an original political or legal tradition,
administration is among the oldest practices of governments. Indeed, it is
impossible to conceive of government without administration. Laws need to
be enforced, legislation needs to be implemented, and collective goods need
to be secured. Governance is mostly a matter of actions and practices, making
administration perhaps the most truly reﬂective aspect of legal and political
culture.
Bernard Bailyn found the “origins of American politics” in the formidable
and positive administrative tasks of the ﬁrst colonial legislatures, from land
distribution to the building of wharves, roads, ferries, public vessels, and civic
buildings to the establishment of towns, schools, colleges, and religious
institutions.1 About 60 percent of the laws passed in colonial Virginia, Bailyn
1 BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 103 (1968). As Bailyn put it,
“colonial legislatures were led willy-nilly, by the force of circumstance . . . to construe as public law
what in England was ‘private, local and facultative.’” Id. at 102. In South Carolina, examples included
the administration of “lawyers’ fees,” city “building codes,” the “conduct of seamen,” the “regulation
of merchandising, the tenure of church pews, and a program of farm subsidies.” Id. at 103 n.37.
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noted, were essentially administrative, “pertaining to social and economic
problems.”2 Hendrik Hartog followed this trail of administration from
colonial legislatures into county courts in eighteenth-century Massachusetts,
identifying a “continuum of criminal and administrative action” wherein a
court’s responsibilities “were deﬁned less by its formal legal jurisdiction than
by the needs of governance”—especially the administration of liquor
licensing, poor relief, and road building and repair.3 By the early nineteenth
century, Alexis de Tocqueville deemed this pervasive, popular, and local
approach to positive administration akin to the essence of democracy in
America. Tocqueville drew explicit attention to the array of local
administrators, such as “selectmen,” “assessors,” “collectors,” “road-surveyors,”
and “tithing-men,” carrying out the administrative policies of “wellregulated” communities, from the “construction of sewers” and the location
of “slaughterhouses” to “public health” administration and “licensing.”4
Formal administrative boards, commissions, departments, and oﬃces were
part and parcel of early American governmental tradition.
Moreover, this early original penchant for administration was hardly
conﬁned to local, regional, or municipal governance. In England, as John
Brewer and Steve Pincus have most eﬀectively argued, the rationalization and
centralization of nation-state administration—especially around ﬁscal and
military prerogatives—was an important harbinger of modernity (and
revolution) since at least the seventeenth century. For Brewer, “[t]he late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw an astonishing transformation in
British government, one which put muscle on the bones of the British body
politic, increasing its endurance, strength and reach.”5 At the heart of this
governmental revolution were the clerks—those “pale and shadowy ﬁgures”
at “the seat of dullness”—who implemented “the growth of a sizable public
administration devoted to organizing the ﬁscal and military activities of the
state.”6 Pincus summed up the broad administrative trend that upended
Europe from the Glorious Revolution to the French Revolution as “state
modernization”:

Id. at 103 n. 37.
Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 284, 288, 323 (1976).
4 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 45, 53 (1838). See also generally
STEPHEN SAWYER, DEMOS ASSEMBLED: DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF
THE MODERN STATE, 1840—1880 (2018) (giving a breakthrough revisionist account of Tocqueville
on administration and police power).
5 JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688–
1783, at xvii (1989).
6 Id. at xvi, xvii (emphasis added).
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[A]n eﬀort to centralize and bureaucratize political authority, an initiative to
transform the military using the most up-to-date techniques, a program to
accelerate economic growth and shape the contours of society using the tools
of the state, and the deployment of techniques allowing the state to gather
information . . . .7

Contravening theories of American exceptionalism, this early
modernization of national administration did not bypass the early United
States. Rather, Jerry Mashaw has now deﬁnitively established the long and
deep historical origins of American administrative law and a national
administrative state. “From the earliest day of the republic,” Mashaw
demonstrated, “Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed
them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of administrative
adjudication, and speciﬁcally authorized administrative rulemaking.”8 Of the
ﬁfty-one major federal administrative agencies at the time of the
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), eleven traced their origins to statutes
passed before the Civil War, and most of those to the extraordinary creation
of federal administration in the very ﬁrst Congress: the U.S. Customs
Service, Veterans Pensions, Patent Oﬃce, Oﬃce of Indian Aﬀairs,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, General Land Oﬃce, Bureau of Marine
Inspection and Navigation, Passport Division, Oﬃce of the Chief Engineers,
Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Postmaster General.9 Mashaw
described the vital activities (and internal administrative rules and practices)
of a wide range of administrative oﬃcers—from the Attorney General and
U.S. Attorneys to Treasury and Customs and Postal oﬃcials—culminating as
early as 1852 in a national steamboat inspection regime that administratively
“combined something of the ‘New Deal’ independent regulatory commission
with ‘Great Society’ health and safety regulation . . . .”10 Nicholas Parrillo has
supplemented this rich portrait with an even wider accounting of the army of
administrative oﬃcials enabled by the comprehensive fee, prize, and bounty
systems that proliferated before the modern “salary revolution” in American
government: district attorney fees for successful prosecutions, tax “ferret”
7 STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 36 (2009). See generally CHARLES
TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES: AD 990-1990 (1990) (explaining the
central role of administration in the complex history of European state formation).
8 JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 5 (2012).
9 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 8-9 (1941). For
the classic histories of administration in the United States before the Civil War, see generally
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948);
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1801-1829
(1951); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 18291861 (1954).
10 Mashaw, supra note 8, at 187.
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fees for detecting tax evaders, naval bounties for captured ships, land oﬃcer
fees for homestead applications, government doctor fees for deciding
veteran’s beneﬁts, and so on.11 National administration and a surprisingly
sophisticated structure of administrative law was entrenched in the United
States for a century before the so-called invention of modern administration
in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.
So we now have a new and “long” history of administration to
contemplate from 1787 to 1887 and beyond. Clearly administration per se is
not a recent American invention. The question remains, however, what
exactly the relationship is between the sprawling early American regime of
administration acknowledged by Bailyn, Hartog, Tocqueville, Mashaw, and
Parrillo and the later changes in administrative regulation that took place at
the turn of the twentieth century. Are these regimes of a piece—similar,
contiguous, and continuous—reﬂective of an evolution rather than a
revolution? Or are there still some dramatic diﬀerences and changes circa 1887
that suggest not a move from absence to presence (historians have certainly
slain that beast), but perhaps a transformation nonetheless?
Despite deep historical roots in the American governmental tradition, the
increased proliferation, professionalization, centralization, and rationalization
of administration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
amounted to a change in kind—a transformation nonetheless. While
commentators such as Tocqueville long recognized the origins of
administration in the practical politics of addressing social problems and
meeting collective needs (from poor relief to local infrastructural
development), the very nature and conception of those problems and those
needs were fundamentally transformed in the era of mass society and mass
democracy. The basic direction of change moved distinctly from a political
culture of particularity with a wide tolerance of distinction to one of
generality with a preference for uniformity. Localized, jurisdictional, and
quasi-private rulemaking and oﬃce-holding ineluctably gave way to a more
centralized, political, and distinctly public vision of administration and
administrative law.12 Just as conceptions of national citizenship and
11 NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 1 (2013); see also id. at 198 (“Tax ferrets had the incentive
and the will to engage in surveillance in a way the local assessors never had.”).
12 Of course, this is one of the key themes of Nicholas Parrillo’s work on the “salary revolution”
in government. Beyond professionalization and civil service, “[u]niform fee schedules for oﬃcial
services” were part of a movement toward “uniformity,” including the trend “to suppress private
laws and local laws,” “the replacement of special corporate charters with general incorporation,” and
“the shift in public ﬁnance from ad hoc levies . . . toward a general property tax.” Id. at 92. On a
similar trend from private to public prosecution in criminal justice, see ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 1 (1989); WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (2011).

2019]

The Progressive Idea of Democratic Administration

1827

constitutional rights grudgingly shed an earlier history of localism,
particularity, and discrimination, the nature of social representation through
democratic politics and statecraft moved just as slowly—but surely—toward
more generalized conceptions of social need and public interest. The political
culture of generality involved a new vision of a democratic society
autonomously responsible for the production of its own collective future as
well as a new understanding of positive and purposeful political freedom.13
Administration was the primary vehicle of this new vision of state and law—
a new public administration and a modern administrative law—committed to
serving society’s needs and meeting a redeﬁned general public interest.
Such new and positive ideas of statecraft, law, and administration quickly
moved the American polity beyond traditional concerns with the
maintenance of public order and early techniques of local-legal policing and
ﬁscal-military organization. A distinctly modern notion of a public service state
came into being, self-consciously oriented around the signiﬁcant new
obligations of tackling large-scale public problems and satisfying everexpanding socioeconomic needs. No one apprehended this functionalist shift
from “public authority” to “public service” better than the French legal
sociologist and state theorist Léon Duguit. Duguit argued that patrimonial
and authoritarian forms of state were in decline amid the rise of new forms
of social interdependence and democratic political aspiration. As he observed,
“Government and its oﬃcials are no longer the masters of men imposing the
sovereign will on their subjects . . . . They are simply the managers of the
nation’s business.”14 Duguit came to the attention of most Americans through
the interventions of Harold Laski who counseled Roscoe Pound that “[t]he
most striking change in the political organization of the last half century is
the rapidity with which . . . the state has been driven to assume a positive
character . . . . We live in a new world, and a new theory of the state is
necessary to its adequate operation.”15 Laski’s other chief correspondent, Felix
Frankfurter, was already building such a new theory of the state around what
he called “Public Services and the Public.” Beyond the “traditional
governmental functions of police and justice,” Frankfurter identiﬁed a new
relationship of “The Public and Its Government” structured around the new
13 On the political culture of generality, see PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY: IMPARTIALITY, REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY, 38-43 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2011)
(2008); Marcel Gauchet, Democracy: From One Crisis to Another, in 1 SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 163-87
(Natalie Doyle trans., 2015); Wim Weymans, Freedom Through Political Representation: Lefort, Gauchet
and Rosanvallon on the Relationship Between State and Society, 4 EUR. J. POL. THEORY, 263, 276 (2005).
14 LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 51 (1919). See also ROSANVALLON , supra
note 13, at 39 (“[T]hose who govern are not merely instruments of an authority that looms above
the society that instituted it. They are merely the managers of the public’s business.”).
15 Harold J. Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England: To Roscoe Pound, 32 HARV. L. REV.
447, 462, 472 (1919).
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“tasks of government, the demands citizens make upon government, [and]
the instruments by which these demands are executed . . . .”16 Consequently,
modern public law added to its purview an ever-expanding body of rules and
institutions for the eﬃcient management, organization, and control of public
services and policies. As Duguit concluded, “[p]ublic law is thus no longer
the body of rules regulating the relation of a sovereign state with its subjects;
it is rather the body of rules inherently necessary to the organisation and
management of certain services.”17
This articulation began the road to a reimagined administration. The
modern reorientation of a reorganized state around the provision of public
services brought increased attention to the science of public administration
and the development of administrative law as scholars such as Woodrow
Wilson, Frank Goodnow, Ernst Freund, Bruce Wyman, Felix Frankfurter,
and James Landis elevated the topics to new heights of analytical scrutiny and
self-consciousness. “Administrative law has not come like a thief in the night,”
Frankfurter contended, but “general recognition” and “self-conscious
direction” were another matter.18 The phrase “administrative law” ﬁrst
appeared in the U.S. Supreme Court Reports in 1909 and sporadically for the
next generation.19 From Wilson to Frankfurter to Landis, two generations of
political and legal scholars worked assiduously, as Ernst Freund put it, to
make administrative law “more familiar to the public, and especially to the
legal profession,” turning it into one of the more “recognized branches of
public law.”20 Modern administration was a central part to what Woodrow
Wilson labeled the “New Meaning of Government.” Wilson held that the
expansion and rationalization of governmental administration was a necessary
product of the increasing functions and demands placed on modern social
service states, from conservation to pure food and drugs to labor and price
regulation to public health and sanitation by reasoning:

FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 2, 81 (1930).
DUGUIT, supra note 14, at 243.
Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 47 YALE L.J. 515, 517 (1938).
American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 350 (1909). See also
Frankfurter, supra note 18, at 517. As Frankfurter complained: “To this day administrative law has no
rubric in the ordinary digests, and ﬂickering cross-references to the subject ﬁrst begin to appear in
220 United States Reports. Not until 280 United States Reports does the term appear to have
established itself in the index.” Id. at 518.
20 Ernst Freund, The Law of the Administration in America, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 403, 404 (1894).
Furthermore, consider that in 1894, Freund was still talking in terms of “law of the administration.”
Id. Freund lauds FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,
FRANCE AND GERMANY 7 (1893), for popularizing the apt term “administrative law”—“[i]ts subject
matter being the administration of public aﬀairs, as distinguished from legislation on the one side
and from the jurisdiction of the courts on the other.” Freund, supra, at 404.
16
17
18
19
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Nowadays we consider it the duty of statesmen to see that women are not
overburdened with work; that children are not dwarfed and stunted by too
great a burden of labor; that factories are properly ventilated; that dangerous
machinery is properly guarded; that rivers are kept pure and cities clean; that
hospitals are provided; that education is put within the reach of everybody,
and that the humblest citizen of our country has a full chance to live and
thrive.21

“Administration is everywhere putting its hands to new undertakings,”
Wilson argued in “The Study of Administration” and went on to explain that
“[t]he idea of the state and the consequent ideal of its duty are undergoing
noteworthy change; and ‘the idea of the state is the conscience of
administration.’”22 In “The Task of Administrative Law,” Felix Frankfurter
also connected the growth of administration and administrative law to new
tasks of state: “[p]rofound new forces call for new social inventions . . . . The
‘great society,’ with its permeating inﬂuence of technology, large-scale
industry, and progressive urbanization, presses its problems.”23 Leonard D.
White deﬁned “public administration” simply as “the management of men
and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state[,] . . . the
most eﬃcient utilization of the resources at the disposal of oﬃcials[,] . . .
[and] the most rapid and complete achievement of public purposes.”24
As Wilson, Frankfurter, White, and many others made clear, the turn-ofthe-century revolution in administration was very much concerned with
eﬃciency, expertise, professionalization, rationalization, centralization, and
scientiﬁc and technical management and organization. But it must be
underscored the degree to which the self-conscious development of modern
administration and administrative law turned on a new generalization of
social and public interest. The invention of modern American administration
was distinctly connected to a positive reform agenda and the progressive idea
of the state as an eﬃcient mechanism of larger social and public purpose.
Herbert Croly famously articulated a broad vision of progressive democracy
bound to the “expression of a permanent public interest” as “interested in
eﬃcient administration as it is in reconstructive legislation.”25 In his path21 Woodrow Wilson, The New Meaning of Government, WOMAN’S HOME COMPANION, Nov.
1912, at 4. Elaborated further, Wilson’s new vision of administration was distinctly tied to a new
conception of “democratic government.” Id. at 3. “Before the dawn of democracy,” Wilson contended
bluntly, “[m]en were allowed to die like ﬂies.” Id. at 4.
22 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887) (internal
citation omitted).
23 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 617 (1927).
24 LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2
(1926).
25 Herbert Croly, State Political Reorganization, 6 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 122, 132 (1912).
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breaking treatise The Principles of the Administrative Law Governing the
Relations of Public Oﬃcers, Bruce Wyman ﬁrst laid out his famous basic
framework of “internal” and “external” administrative law while
simultaneously contemplating the law of public service corporations and the
general growth of state regulation at the turn of the twentieth century.26 As
Wyman put it, “[s]tate regulation is the prevailing philosophy . . . the spirit
of our present age.”27 “The present programme of organized society,” he
noted, recognized “that freedom of action may, even in the industrial world,
work injuriously for the public, and it must then be restrained in the public
interest.”28 For Frankfurter, public service, public interest, and “public trust”
were at the very heart of the project of administrative law from the ﬁrst state
railroad commissions to the more omnibus state public utility commissions
to the national development of the ﬁrst independent regulatory
commissions.29 The “range and complexity” of these commissions,
Frankfurter contended, “constituted new political inventions responsive to
the pressure of new economic and social facts.”30 Frankfurter frequently
invoked Governor Charles Evans Hughes’s famous 1907 defense of
administrative regulation: “There is also need of regulation and strict
supervision to ensure adequate service and due regard for the convenience
and safety of the public. The most practicable way of attaining these ends is
for the Legislature to confer proper power upon a subordinate administrative
body.”31 “Commodore Vanderbilt’s ‘the public be damned’ had at last a
counterpoise” in what Frankfurter called “the quiet work of public
administration”—“solid proof that government could meet needs of society
at once the most complicated and fundamental.”32

26 See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903).
27 1 BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS
AND ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT vi (1911).
28 Id.
29 See FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 86 (“[N]ew legislation was intended to create
governmental instruments and processes through which sound relations between public utilities and
the public could work themselves out. To that end, a nonpolitical administrative agency was
established . . . .”).
30 Id. at 88.
31 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES,
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, 1906–1908, at 89–90 (1908).
32 FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 89, 134. For an excellent book-length examination of these
links between progressivism, democracy, and administration, see BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S
LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (2019).
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II. THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION
With the rapid proliferation of modern public services, the American
administrative state—along all of its jurisdictional dimensions (local, state,
and federal)—reached an important point of modern development. Positive
conceptions of statecraft and law yielded a more pragmatic and instrumental
vision of government directed toward the resolution of public problems and
the satisfaction of social needs. Public administration and administrative law
achieved a new self-consciousness and visibility as the principle vehicles for
the general delivery of an ever-expanding array of state services. The period
from 1866–1932 was nothing less than an age of administration.
And there is no shortage of political, legal, and historical assessments of
this modern administrative revolution.33 To date, however, the dominant
interpretations have been captured by a single, overriding theme—the rise of
modern bureaucracy and technocracy. Here, the modern history of the
administrative state is subsumed beneath a veritable “bureaucracy fetish.”34
Max Weber contributed the archetype, placing at the very center of
modernity “the basic fact of the irresistible advance of bureaucratization,”
wherein “the bureaucratic apparatus” concentrates the “means of operation.”35
As Talcott Parsons once put it, “[r]oughly, for Weber, bureaucracy plays the
part that the class struggle played for Marx . . . .”36 Jürgen Habermas echoed
this, stating that “[f]or Weber, bureaucratization is a key to understanding
33 See generally, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES,
1862–1928 (2001); BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1996); JOHN A. ROHR, TO
RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986); STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982); RICHARD J. STILLMAN II, CREATING THE
AMERICAN STATE: THE MORAL REFORMERS AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE WORLD
THEY MADE (1998); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1967); Louis
Galambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44 BUS. HIST. REV.
279 (1970).
34 See William J. Novak, Beyond Max Weber: The Need for a Democratic (Not Aristocratic) Theory
of the Modern State, 36 TOCQUEVILLE REV. 43, 74-76 (2015) (describing the tendency of conﬂating
“the state” with “bureaucracy”).
35 MAX WEBER, The Bureaucratization of Politics and the Economy, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY 109, 110, 114 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1999). The heightened attention to bureaucracy
in Weber was only exacerbated by an American reception that ﬁrst translated and ﬁxated on the
“bureaucratic” aspects of his oeuvre. See generally MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 196-244 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946). Robert
K. Merton’s Social Theory and Social Structure contained no index entry for “state,” but seventeen
separate entries for various discussions of “bureaucracy” and “bureaucratization.” ROBERT K.
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 693-94 (2d ed. 1968).
36 2 TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A GROUP OF RECENT EUROPEAN WRITERS 509 (1949).
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modern societies.”37 “[P]rogress” toward “bureaucratic oﬃcialdom” and the
“bureaucratic state” became the “unambiguous yardstick” for assessing
modernization and its unambiguous turn toward systems rationality,
centralization,
professionalization,
expertise,
and
autonomous
administration.38 “Routines of administration”—that is, processes of
“adjudicating and administering according to rationally established law and
regulation”—were necessary accoutrements of a modern system of rule
“necessarily and unavoidably” bureaucratic.39 As Theodore Lowi concluded,
such rationalized administration “may indeed be the sine qua non of
modernity.”40
Of course, Max Weber was notoriously ambivalent about the normative
implications of this modern governmental turn towards bureaucratic
administration. His pessimistic assessments of modernity’s “iron cage” and
“shell of bondage” have been seconded by a legion of students of bureaucracy
who see the administrative revolution as a troubling departure from original
traditions of self-rule, popular governance, and political autonomy, raising
concerns about technocracy, the relentless conquest of instrumental
rationality, and roads to future serfdom and despotism. From propagandistic
critiques such as James Beck’s Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy,41 to popular
37 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 306 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 3d ed.
1987) (1981). Habermas elaborated on Weber’s notion of a modern “society of organizations,” observing
that “economic production is organized in a capitalist manner, with rationally calculating entrepreneurs;
public administration is organized in a bureaucratic manner, with juristically trained, specialized officials—
that is, they are organized in the form of private enterprises and public bureaucracies.” Id.
38 WEBER, Bureaucratization, supra note 35, at 109.
39 Id. at 109-110. In Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Weber expanded
these categories into eight more speciﬁc attributes of modern “legal authority with a bureaucratic
administrative staﬀ ”: 1) the continuous rule-bound conduct of oﬃcial business; 2) the rigorous
speciﬁcation of jurisdictional competence; 3) the hierarchical organization of oﬃces; 4) the
governance of oﬃces via technical rules or norms; 5) the separation of ownership and control in
administrative decisionmaking; 6) the objective rather than subjective nature of rights in an oﬃce;
7) the importance of written documentation of administrative acts, decisions, and rules; and 8) the
presence of an elaborate administrative staﬀ-oﬃcialdom, bureaucracy. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 218-219 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoﬀ et al. trans., 1968).
40 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 21 (2d ed., 1979) (“The modern method of social control involves the application
of rationality to all social relations . . . . Rationality applied to social control is administration.”).
41 See, e.g., JAMES M. BECK, OUR WONDERLAND OF BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF THE
GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND ITS DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT
UPON THE CONSTITUTION vii (1932) (originating a persistent Alice-in-Wonderland trope in the
history of administration, where “Uncle Sam has many of the child-like and naive characteristics of
little Alice, and . . . he, too, is dreaming in a wonderland of socialistic experiments in a government,
whose constitution was intended to be a noble assertion of individualism.”); E. PENDLETON
HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST xi-xii (1936) (deploying the
same Lewis Carroll chapter headings).
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explorations like Walter Lippmann’s The Phantom Public,42 to political and
sociological assessments like James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution and
C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite, treatments of the modern administration
as an anti-democratic bureaucracy and elite technocracy abound.43 For Jürgen
Habermas, “the mounting bureaucratization of the administration in state
and society” and the rise of planning, distribution, and government
intervention by “highly specialized experts” spelled the doom of the “critical
publicity” of the bourgeois public sphere.44 Like his Frankfurt school
colleagues, Habermas fretted about “the lure of technocracy,” the divorce of
organized system from ethical life, and the ultimate threat that “the technical
means of destruction increase along with the technical means of satisfying
needs.”45 Even Pierre Rosanvallon assessed these turn-of-the-century
administrative developments as bureaucratic, technocratic, and ultimately
worrisome: “The emphasis on eﬃciency and scientiﬁc administration revived
an old prejudice . . . . It was for want of being able . . . to conceive of
government democratically that administrative-executive power once more
came to be accepted in both France and America as a central element of
governmental organization in the guise of technocracy.”46 Such elite
technocratic administration reﬂected an inability or at least an unwillingness
to think government democratically.47 Of course, a ﬂood of late twentieth
century neo-liberal critiques of the modern regulatory and social-welfare
state loudly echoed such indictments of the dangerous, anti-democratic
nature of bureaucratic administration.48
42 See, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (Macmillan Co. 1961) (1922); WALTER
LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925).
43 See generally KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION: A STUDY
IN THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1953); JAMES BURNHAM, THE
MACHIAVELLIANS: DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM (1943); JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE WORLD (1941); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER
ELITE (1956); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
44 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY, 233, 235 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989).
45 Id. at 234-35. See also generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE LURE OF TECHNOCRACY (Ciaran
Cronin trans., 2015).
46 PIERRE ROSANVALLON, GOOD GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRACY BEYOND ELECTIONS 6263 (Malcolm DeBevoise trans., Harvard University Press 2018) (2015).
47 See generally id.
48 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) (providing the
critique along these lines—taking explicit issue with the entire canon on the modern administrative
state); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (same). See also generally ANGUS
BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION
(2012); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); CHARLES MURRAY,
LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE
MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998); Gary S. Becker, Competition
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In law, this anti-bureaucratic position has a distinguished (if
predominantly Anglo-Saxon) pedigree. Building on a nineteenth century
British constitutional literature increasingly aimed—in Henry Maine’s
words—at “applying the curb to popular impulses,”49 Albert Venn Dicey made
the formal legal case against administration as bureaucracy—as Gallican droit
administratif.50 Dicey viewed the historic English rule of law tradition as
inherently antithetical to an administrative law that he deemed foreign and
dangerous: “the whole scheme of administrative law was opposed to . . .
essential characteristics of English institutions.”51 Dicey saw seeds of tyranny
in administrators “who, if not actually part of the executive, are swayed by
oﬃcial sympathies, and who are inclined to consider the interest of the state,
or of the government, more important than strict regard to the legal rights of
individuals.”52 As Felix Frankfurter noted, “Few law books in modern times
have had an inﬂuence comparable to that produced by the brilliant
obfuscation of Dicey’s The Law of the Constitution.”53 But despite what
Frankfurter described as Dicey’s “sociological sterility” and “misconceptions
and myopia,” about the “[r]ule of [l]aw” versus “the development of
administrative law,” Dicey’s indictment of administration as foreign statism
continued to inﬂuence “[g]enerations of judges and lawyers.”54
Indeed, today it remains common for discussion of the administrative
revolution to take the form of an ongoing duel between bureaucracy and the
rule of law. According to a recent inﬂuential historical treatment, the struggle
over modern administration was “Tocqueville’s nightmare.”55 Tocqueville’s
alleged nightmare was nothing less than centralized administrative
“bureaucracies through which federal oﬃcials could impose their will on a
dispersed and factious people.”56 Should centralized administration and
and Democracy, 1 J.L. & ECON. 105 (1958); THE WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET: WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996 (1996).
49 SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: FOUR ESSAYS xi (2d ed. 1886).
50 A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 323
(6th ed. 1902).
51 Id. at 349.
52 Id. at 334. For earlier and later juxtapositions of Anglican versus Gallican liberty, see 1
FRANCIS LIEBER, The Ancienct and the Modern Teacher of Politics, in REMINISCENCES, ADDRESSES,
AND ESSAYS 369-388 (1881); Friedrich A. Hayek, Freedom, Reason, and Tradition, 68 ETHICS 229
(1958) (contemplating the twentieth century stakes of this debate: “It was, in the end, the victory of
the Benthamite Philosophical Radicals over the Whigs in England that concealed a fundamental
diﬀerence which in more recent years has reappeared as the conﬂict between ‘liberal’ democracy and
‘social’ or totalitarian democracy.”).
53 Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 47 YALE L.J. 515, 517 (1938).
54 Id.
55 DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA: 1900-1940 (2014).
56 Id. at 1.
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bureaucracy carry the day, Tocqueville warned, “a more insuﬀerable
despotism would prevail than any which now exists in the monarchical states
of Europe . . . .”57 For Daniel Ernst, the answer to the specter of
totalitarianism haunting the development of the bureaucratic state was again
the rule of law as a cadre of artful American lawyers built into administrative
law constitutional curbs protecting a modicum of concern for due process,
judicial review, individual rights, and limited government.58 For Philip
Hamburger, even such legal and constitutional protections were not enough,
as he deemed the administrative power underwriting the modern American
bureaucracy “absolutist,” “extralegal,” “supralegal,” “unconstitutional,” and
basically “unlawful.”59 Hamburger’s position is comparable to that of Dicey,
who argued: “The words ‘administrative law’ . . . are unknown to English
judges . . . . This absence from our language of any satisfactory equivalent for
the expression droit administratif is signiﬁcant; the want of a name arises at
bottom from our non-recognition of the thing itself.”60 Like Frankfurter,
Bruce Wyman’s Administrative Law deemed a Diceyean position basically outof-date in America as early as 1903.61
It is important, however, to underscore how all these approaches to the
modern administrative revolution elide one of its foundational premises—
democracy. Administration and administrative law were crucial parts of the
transformation of public law that created a new democratic state. All of the
exclusive emphasis on bureaucracy and the rule of law in this period has come
at the expense of what this generation claimed over and over again was
actually at stake in these contests and struggles—the making of a new
democracy. It would be a mistake of historical interpretation to confuse the
modern transformation of American administration with an anti-democratic
bureaucratic or technocratic archetype.
As Stephen Sawyer has convincingly shown, Tocqueville himself was no
inveterate opponent of administration or administrative law per se. Nor did he see

ERNST, supra note 55, at 1 (quoting Tocqueville).
Id. As Jeremy Kessler points out in a capacious review, Ernst’s approach to the administrative
state’s underlying legitimacy is not only “legalistic,” but “antidemocratic”—essentially writing out of
the story “New Deal stalwarts” who were more “antiformalist and anticourt, more pro-administration
and . . . prolabor . . . .” Jeremy Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV.
718, 733 (2016) (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA: 1900-1940 (2014)).
59 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 12-13 (2014).
60 DICEY, supra note 50, at 323.
61 BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE
RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 2 (1903). Wyman artfully began his treatise with a long excerpt
from Dicey and then concluded, “When the highest authority declares in so explicit a manner that
administrative law is impossible under the common law system, at all events one thing can be
promised in this course of lectures–-novelty of subject.” Id.
57
58
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administration as inherently at odds with democracy. To the contrary, his
reflections on New England police power, as well as his concerns with inequality
and pauperism, made it clear that a certain kind of administration was absolutely
necessary to democratic states tending to the social-economic demands of a
politically empowered and self-governing people. Tocqueville was concerned
about the dangers of a Napoleonic centralization severed from the people such as
a consolidated executive power that governed civil society but that no longer arose
from it (after all, that was the problem of the Ancien Régime). But he explicitly
acknowledged that “[t]he social order was in the throes of a rapid evolution, giving
rise to new needs, and each of these was an added source of power to the central
government”62: to include “relief measures,” “public works programs,” “social
service programs,” control of “money and credit,” economic regulation, etc.63 Such
growing social and economic needs—the “care to be taken of the people”—showed
no signs of dissipating in modern industrializing societies.64 So in the end,
Tocqueville understood the positive problem of developing a democratic form of
effective state administration to be the central problem of the age: “Our
administrative law has generated intelligent and useful commentaries, but it has
not been studied or judged as a whole by a great public thinker . . . . [T]here is
perhaps no other subject in our times that merits more attention by our
philosophers and statesmen.”65
The founders of modern American administrative law and statecraft were
only too aware of Tocqueville’s democratic mandate. As early as 1887,
Woodrow Wilson insisted that modern American administration was not
about bureaucracy and technocracy: “[T]o fear the creation of a domineering,
illiberal oﬃcialism . . . is to miss altogether the principle upon which I wish
most to insist. That principle is, that administration in the United States must
be at all points sensitive to public opinion.”66 Wilson’s “new meaning of
government” was deeply rooted in a fundamentally democratic aspiration
worth quoting at length:
Democratic government has, the world over, had deep and far-reaching
results. It has created a new conception of the functions of government. It is
not merely that democratic government is based, as the old phrase used to
go, on the “consent of the governed,” but that it is based upon the
participation in government of all classes and interests; and whenever this

62 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 59
(Stuart Gilbert trans., 1955) (1856).
63 Louis Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville and Public Administration, 2 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 221, 236
(1942).
64 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 62, at 265.
65 SAWYER, supra note 45, at 42-43 (quoting Tocqueville).
66 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 216 (1887).
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conception can be realized, whenever government is disentangled from its
connection with special interests and made responsive to genuine public
opinion, throughout the length and breadth of the great country, it at once
gets new ideals and responds to new impulses. It then becomes an instrument
of civilization and of humanity . . . . It is part of the new meaning of
government, therefore, that its resources are not to be put at the disposal of
a governing class or of any limited set of governing inﬂuences, but that those
who exercise its authority must “keep house” for the whole people . . . . It is
an interesting circumstance that government is becoming less and less a
business for politicians; that minds and energies of every kind are turning
towards it as part of the general enterprise of life . . . . These changes in the
business and character of government are not taking place because of any
special knowledge of a few men, the leaders of parties and of public thought.
They are, on the contrary, coming from out of the general body of the nation
itself. The government is becoming more and more a sensitive, registering
instrument. Public opinion has accumulated tremendous force in our day, not
only, but it shows inﬁnite richness and variety. Men of many occupations, of
many interests, of many aspirations, contribute to it. Neighborhood
meetings, city assemblies, state conventions, interstate gatherings, national
conventions, are held by people of every sort interested in every kind of
occupation . . . . The ﬁne result of it all is that the common interest is
becoming more and more clear . . . . For government is an instrument, not an
object in itself. We ought to be interested in it only as it express the purpose
of the people of the country.”67

Of course, sentiments like these at the very foundation of modern
American administration encapsulated the dominant themes of progressive
new democracy—from its anti-formalism to its substantive vision of
democracy as a “way of life”; from its critique of private power and plutocracy
to its endorsement of pubic interest. While rationalization, systemization,
and professionalization were certainly key aspects of modern governmental
process, the administrative revolution was born of a radical reform energy
and an insurgent self-consciousness concerning the new inequalities,
exclusions, oppressions, and acute social needs that threatened the democratic
legitimacy of American public and private life. In place of bureaucracy or
technocracy—yet along some kind of ancient Whig constitution or “rule of
law”—the history of the origins of the modern American administrative state
must ﬁrst be understood in the context of such new democratic principles.
The ﬁrst thing to note about the architects of modern American
administrative law is that they were radical anti-formalists in the new
67

Wilson, supra note 21, at 3-4.
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democratic tradition. Frank J. Goodnow, frequently acknowledged as the
“father of American administration,” produced many technical treatises on
the subject.68 But he was also author of one of the era’s most inﬂuential and
radical critiques of formal law and conservative constitutionalism.69 Joining
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States70 and J. Allen Smith’s The Spirit of American Government,71 Goodnow’s
Social Reform and the Constitution carved out a critical legal space for the
development of the new administrative state.72 Taking note of the
“tremendous changes in political and social conditions,” Goodnow advocated
a critical, pragmatic, and historicist approach to law and constitution averse
to the static anachronisms of formal juristic conservatism.73 Echoing Smith’s
chapter titled “The Constitution as a Reactionary Document,”74 Goodnow
attacked “the superstitious reverence” that accepted the Constitution as “the
last word which can be said as to the proper form of government . . . suited
to all times and conditions.”75 Such constitutional formalism, he noted,
imported an eighteenth century political theory of social compact and natural
right that presupposed that society was “static rather than progressive in
character.”76 The unfortunate result was “to ﬁx upon the country for all time
institutions, which . . . may in this the twentieth century be unsuitable
because of the economic, social, and political changes which have taken place
in the last hundred years.”77 He embraced Theodore Roosevelt’s critique of
the “false but mischievous” view of the Constitution as a “strait-jacket to be
68 See generally GOODNOW, supra note 20; FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT (1900); FRANK J. GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916); FRANK J. GOODNOW, SELECTED CASES ON
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF OFFICERS
AND EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1906); FRANK J. GOODNOW, SELECTED CASES ON
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (1906); FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1905). See also generally ESSAYS ON THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF FRANK
JOHNSON GOODNOW (Charles G. Haines & Marshall E. Dimock eds., 1935).
69 See FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911).
70 CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
71 J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN, INFLUENCE AND RELATION TO DEMOCRACY (1907).
72 GOODNOW, supra note 69. See also generally LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1932) (taking the other truly radical tract in this legal-constitutional tradition).
73 GOODNOW, supra note 69, at 1.
74 See SMITH, supra note 71, at 27-39.
75 GOODNOW, supra note 69, at 9-10.
76 Id. at 308.
77 Id. Like Beard, Smith, and Boudin, Goodnow aﬃrmatively endorsed ongoing criticism of
the Court and the Constitution: “In these days of rapid economic and social change, when it is more
necessary than ever before that our law should be ﬂexible . . . it is on this criticism . . . that we must
rely if we are to hope for that orderly and progressive development . . . .” Id. at 359.
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used for the control of an unruly patient—the people.”78 Like Wilson,
Goodnow endorsed instead a new positive, progressive, and dynamic
approach to the Constitution that would enable a new public law and
administration—ﬂexible, responsive to public opinion, and adaptable to the
changing needs of modern public life. This was a new democratic vision of
constitutional dynamism in the public interest: “[O]ur constitutions are
instruments designed to secure justice by securing the deliberate but eﬀective
expression of the popular will.”79
Modern administrative law emerged directly out of such democraticallyoriented antiformalism. The constitutional critiques of reformers like
Goodnow, Smith, and Beard provided the intellectual groundwork for a
jurisprudential transition away from traditional ideas about quasi-private
oﬃce-holders and formal constitutional limitations and towards the public
law legitimacy of broad-scale legislative and administrative action in the
public interest. Such a critical perspective was a key part of Goodnow’s eﬀort
to create a generalized vision of public state administrators beyond the highly
particularized and partial constraints of the fee system as well as existing
common-law rules governing oﬃce-holding.80 And it was equally crucial to
Goodnow’s attempt to create room for administration beyond the formal
constitutional conceptions of federalism and separation of powers. Ernst
Freund, Goodnow’s student and the other key “pioneer of administrative
law,”81 also emphasized the central “freeing of American public law from what
he conceived to be the crippling dominance of constitutional law.”82 Realism,
pragmatism, and critical constitutionalism were crucial parts of Goodnow and
Freund’s bold agenda to expand legislative and administrative powers to meet
the demands of social reform for increased legislative regulation, government
aid, and even public ownership.83 As Ernst Freund put it, “Professor
78 Theodore Roosevelt, The Right of the People to Rule, Address at Carnegie Hall (Mar. 20,
1912), in S. DOC. NO. 473, at 7 (1912).
79 Id. See also GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 68,
at 11 (elaborating on Roosevelt’s sartorial metaphor that “the United States Constitution is to the
country what a coat too small in size is to a man. If he buttons it up in front he splits it open
behind.”).
80 GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 68, at 39, 82 (condemning the
former “evils arising from the partial and interested administration of the law” and endorsing
bringing public administration under the same operation of general rules as in the “impartial and
upright” administration of justice generally). See also generally FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS (1890); PARRILLO, supra note 11, at 117; Karen
Orren, Oﬃcers’ Rights: Toward a Unified Field Theory of American Constitutional Development, 34 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 873 (2000).
81 Note, Ernst Freund: Pioneer of Administrative Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 755, 756 (1962).
82 Francis A. Allen, Ernst Freund, 29 U. CHI. L. SCH. REC. 6, 8 (1983).
83 See GOODNOW, supra note 69, at 18-32, 291 (“[C]ourts may . . . conclu[de] that the powers
of the state may constitutionally be used to protect the weaker classes . . . from the dangers not
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Goodnow expresses a generally recognized view when he says that technical
eﬃciency is not the only and not the ﬁrst consideration in the administrative
organization.”84 Modern American administration was no mere elite technical
project. It was radical, critical, and in the end democratic. In Walter Weyl’s
words, it involved a “not unreverential breaking of the tablets of tradition” in
the midst of “a democratic revolt.”85 Like Tocqueville, Freund acknowledged
the “technical superiority” of existing forms of European bureaucracy, but he
made it clear that the task of the age in America consisted of accommodating
necessary administration to the historic project of self-government in an
“extreme democratic spirit.”86
Antiformalism created important new room in American law for the
emergence of a more generalized and public—rather than particularized and
private—conception of administrative action. The second new democratic
idea at play in the development of the modern administrative state further
extended this general public conception by centering a vision of democratic
administration built on the protection of public over and against private
interest. Here, substantive issues of economic inequality, political unfairness,
and systemic bias and discrimination moved to the very center of the
American administrative project. Indeed, one of the leading motivations for
the turn to modern administration was an acute awareness of the troubling
ascendancy of private special economic interests in turn-of-the-century
American politics. Administration was an attempt to reclaim the democratic
high ground in a political regime thoroughly beset by plutocracy and
corruption. Plutocracy and corruption were the ubiquitous political bywords
of the day. And their meaning was clear and unambiguous to all observers—
the anti-democratic capture of the public political sphere by corrupting
private economic interests. Though “regulatory capture” by special interests
is erroneously seen as a problem conﬁned to administrative regulation, it must
be remembered that modern administration was originally developed as an
explicit response to the overwhelming capture of supposedly democratic
legislatures, councils, cities, states, and even courts by dominant economic

merely of disease and unsafe conditions of labor, but as well from those which are attendant upon
great economic dependence in an increasingly industrial society.”).
84 Freund, supra note 20, at 424. It is important to acknowledge here Freund’s equally
signiﬁcant contributions to administrative law. See generally ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1928); ERNST FREUND,
CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
COURTS (1911).
85 WALTER E. WEYL, THE NEW DEMOCRACY: AN ESSAY ON CERTAIN POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 155 (1912).
86 Freund, supra note 20, at 423-24.
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interests. Anti-democratic capture, in other words, was not an unfortunate
consequence of administration, it was arguably its raison d’etre.87
“Our resplendent plutocracy,” was Walter Weyl’s moniker for the corrupt
and aristocratic alliance of “political ‘bosses’” and “railroad ‘kings’” and
“Senate ‘oligarchies’”—the new agglomerations of corporate wealth and
political power that produced a dangerous new mixture of the age-old threat
of private interest trumping public democracy.88 Such “corruption” marked
the rise of an “indiﬀerence to public concerns” that John Dewey and James
Tufts saw as beginnings of an undermining of “the democratic ideal”:
the control of the inner machinery of governmental power by a few who can
work in irresponsible secrecy . . . incites to deliberate perversion of public
functions into private advantages. As embezzlement is appropriation of trust
funds to private ends, so corruption, “graft,” is prostitution of public
resources, whether of power or of money, to personal or class interests.89

As Vernon Parrington put it, from this “degradation of democratic
dogma,” emerged the task of the times “[t]o curb the ambitions of plutocracy
and preserve the democratic bequest for the common beneﬁt of all”—to
“wrest possession of the government from the hands of the plutocracy that
was befouling it, and to use it for democratic rather than plutocratic ends.”90
Administration and administrative law were at the center of that new
democratic quest.
Now, of course, the corrupting threat of private versus public interest to
democratic self-interest was not a wholly modern concern. In Plato’s Republic,
Socrates noted that “in founding the city we are not looking to the exceptional
happiness of any one group among us but, as far as possible, that of the city
as a whole.” “Our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate
happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole . . . .”91 He
bemoaned “the corruption of society” whereby “the guardians of the laws and
of the government are only seeming and not real guardians” who “turn the
State upside down.”92 Aristotle’s Politics also decried the corrupting eﬀects of
private interest and private vice on the commonwealth, noting, the “true
87 See generally William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 25-48 (Daniel
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
88 See WEYL, supra note 85, at 2. See also id. at 80 (“The story of our railroad wreckers, of our
distributors of worthless stocks, of our gentlemanly, manicured thieves of public lands . . . . link[s]
the present with the past in one malodorous chain of ﬁnancial infamy.”).
89 JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 474-77 (1908).
90 VERNON LOUIS PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: VOLUME
THREE: THE BEGINNINGS OF CRITICAL REALISM IN AMERICAN, 1860–1920, at 283 (1930).
91 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. iv 129 (Benjamin Jowett trans. 2012).
92 Id.
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forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the
many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which
rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or
of the many, are perversions.”93 This theme and concern had powerful
resonance throughout early American history—from the concerns of the
founding generation with faction and corruption to the Jacksonian obsession
with private privileges bestowed through corporate charters and other forms
of private legislation.94
Although concern about private interests corrupting the public welfare
was as old as the republic, what was new at the turn of the twentieth century
was an acute awareness of the unprecedented threat to democratic politics
posed by the arrival of large-scale business and corporate interests in rail, oil,
meatpacking, and insurance, whose corruptions were cataloged in a relentless
series of muckraking reports and even ﬁctional portrayals from Charles
Francis and Henry Adams’s Chapters of Erie to Frank Norris’s McTeague, The
Octopus, and The Pit.95 Historian Richard L. McCormick correctly placed this
basic “Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics”—the awakening of the
people to illicit private business inﬂuence in democratic political life—at the
very core of the entire progressive reform movement.96 Ida Tarbell, Lincoln
Steﬀens, Ray Stannard Baker and countless other journalists and scholars
spent enormous time and energy exposing the various frauds, thefts, bribes,
extortions, and schemes that seemed to now permanently link selﬁsh robber
barons to corrupt politicos (to use Matthew Josephson’s evocative terms).97
As Thorstein Veblen concluded in his chapter “Business Principles in Law
and Politics,” “constitutional government has, in the main, become a

93 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS, bk. iii 71 (Steven
Everson ed., 1996).
94 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue and Commerce
in the Eighteenth Century, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 119 (1972); Gordon S. Wood, Conspiracy and the Paranoid
Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century, 39 WM. & MARY 401 (1982). The Boston Daily
Herald complained in 1836, “They are not for the public good—in design or end . . . . [T]hey are for
the aggrandizement of the stockholders—for the promotion of the interest of the few . . . We wish to
have public good and private speculation more distinctly separated . . . .” OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY
FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861, at 213 (rev. ed. 1969).
95 CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR., & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1871);
FRANK NORRIS, MCTEAGUE: A STORY OF SAN FRANCISCO (1899); FRANK NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS:
A STORY OF CALIFORNIA (1901); FRANK NORRIS, THE PIT: A STORY OF CHICAGO (1903).
96 Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the
Origins of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247, 247 (1981).
97 Id. See generally MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS, 1865–1896 (1938); MATTHEW
JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1861–1901 (1934).
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department of the business organization and is guided by the advice of the
business men.”98
Corruption and the pursuit of selﬁsh private and economic interests in
the democratic public sphere was seen as the central problem confronting
American democracy at the turn of the century. And time after time,
administration was oﬀered up as a distinctly democratic solution.
In the economic regulatory ﬁeld, the reformer who most clearly
articulated the explicit relationship between corruption and democratic
administration was Charles Francis Adams. A lawyer, a historian, a regulator,
a railroad executive, and a member of one of the most inﬂuential families in
American politics and letters, Adams was also one of the central pioneers of
modern administration as a response to the scandalous economic and political
corruption that surrounded the railroad problem. The picture Adams painted
was ominous and urgent: in “A Chapter of Erie,” he described the battle for
control of the Erie Railroad between the Erie men—Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and
Daniel Drew—and Cornelius Vanderbilt as nothing less than the “Erie
war”—so rife with corruption that participants were literally running away
with bags of money.99 For Adams, the railroad problem involved not just the
economic crisis of expensive “natural monopolies” operating in an
atmosphere of “ruinous competition.”100 Rather, anticipating Richard
McCormick, Adams contended that the railroad problem involved the
explicitly political problem of private business interests corrupting the public
body politic; “the sturdy corporation beggars who infested the lobby” of state
legislatures.101 As Adams saw it, “our legislatures are now universally
becoming a species of irregular boards of railroad direction” creating
persistent “scandal and alarm.”102 “The eﬀects upon political morality have
been injurious,” he suggested, adding that “[m]any States in this country, and
especially New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland have now for
years notoriously been controlled by their railroad corporations.”103

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 287 (1904).
See generally CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, A Chapter of Erie, in CHAPTERS
OF ERIE supra note 95, at 1. In an excellent account of the crucial role of Adams in modern regulatory
policymaking, Thomas McCraw drew attention to one of Adams’s many classic depictions of Gilded
Age corruption during the Erie war, featuring an interrupted meeting of Daniel Drew in his New
York oﬃce: “[T]he astonished police saw a throng of panic-stricken railway directors—looking more
like a frightened gang of thieves . . . . One individual bore away with him in a hackney-coach bales
containing six millions of dollars in greenbacks.” THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION 16 (1984).
100 ADAMS, JR., supra note 99, at 17. On the complicated economics of railroad regulation, see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 131-148 (1991).
101 CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR., The Railroad System, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE, supra note 95, at 427.
102 Id. at 417.
103 Id. at 418.
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So, here was the original democratic problem posed by the railroads—the
capture of the existing elected legislators and oﬃceholders by the newly
dominant private economic interests. Adams made it clear that “neither
competition nor legislation have proved themselves eﬀective agents for the
regulation of the railroad system.”104 And so, he probed further, “what other
and more eﬀective [instrument] is there within the reach of the American
people?”105 Of course, Adams’s answer was administration. Noting that “there
is no power which can purify a corrupted legislature,” Adams turned instead
to the administrative regulatory commission—independent, permanent, and
competent tribunals that he analogized to courts.106 While it might be
tempting to view this turn to an unelected special regulatory commission as
inherently undemocratic and technocratic, the original impulse was quite the
opposite. Adams noted developments in the Midwest, where administrative
innovations like the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission were
explicitly demanded by popular uprisings and state constitutional
conventions of the people. As Adams put it, “The railroad corporations,
necessarily monopolists, constitute a privileged class living under a form of
government intended to inhibit all class legislation.”107 Therein lay the
substance of antidemocracy—in the private political-economic
aggrandizement of special interests. Democracy required a response in the
form of general laws and general regulations administered again so as to reestablish the priority of general advantage. Adams recommended a
strengthening of governmental administrative power to vindicate the general
interest, arguing that “the task of supervising in some way the railroads of a
modern State does constitute one of the necessary functions of
government.”108
Now, at this critical juncture in the historical development of the modern
administrative regulatory agency, it must be noted that Charles Francis
Adams, Jr. was under no illusion that administration was inherently
democratic—forever magically immune from private inﬂuence, economic
interest, or other forms of special pleading. On the contrary, he speciﬁcally
anticipated the precise question of regulatory capture as early as 1871: “But it
will be said, Who will guard the virtue of the tribunal? Why should the
corporations not deal with [the commissions just] as [they did] with the
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 418.
ADAMS, JR., The Railroad System, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE, supra note 95, at 428.
Id. at 417. Adams interestingly relies on John Stuart Mill for this point: when practical
monopolies exist, “‘it is the part of government either to subject this service to reasonable conditions
for the general advantage, or to retain such power over it, that the proﬁts of the monopoly may at
least be obtained for the public.’” Id.
104
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legislatures?”109 Who would guard the guardians? Adams’s answer to such
questions went to the pragmatic and historical heart of the new democratic
reform project. In a self-governing democracy, there was no ﬁnal guarantee,
no silver bullet, no complete economic or political theory that could forever
preclude the capture and corruption of governmental institutions for private
gain and anti-democratic purpose. Democratic vigilance was as necessary as
it was eternal. In popular forms of government, the only solution was the
pragmatic, ongoing, never-ending tradition of, as Adams phrased it,
continually developing “all the checks and balances that human ingenuity can
devise” to secure more democratic results.110 The solution to the crises of
modern democracy, in short, was more democracy—and democracy, like the
state, must always be rediscovered.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reformers turned to
administration, independent agencies, and regulatory commissions as a new
kind of democratic check on private economic corruption and public legislative
capture. Rather than endorse bureaucracy as some kind of permanent
technocratic response to political modernity, new democratic reformers
explicitly emphasized the themes of corruption and democracy as a prelude to
their administrative reform proposals. The peak years of muckraking
disclosure from 1904 to 1908 were accompanied by a wave of legislative activity
specifically designed to curb the influence of private interest and private
money in American politics, including federal and state corrupt practices, laws
regulating campaign contributions and the solicitation of funds from
corporations, laws regulating legislative lobbying, laws prohibiting free
transportation passes, and political reforms such as direct primaries.111 The
development of modern administration (as well as economic regulatory and
police power measures) must be understood in this larger context of
heightened concern about the susceptibility of existing democratic politics to
capture and corruption by new organizations of private economic interest.
So while most discussions of administrative constitutionalism focus on
problems of capture and democratic deﬁcit in the creation of administration
and bureaucracy, it is important to acknowledge the original democratic
justiﬁcations for modern administrative reform at its moment of inception.
In contrast to historical, legal, and socio-theoretical portraits of the rise of
administration primarily as the product of perhaps inevitable modern turns
toward professionalism, eﬃciency, technical expertise, and systems
Id. at 427.
Id.
See McCormick, supra note 96, at 266-267. See generally HELEN M. ROCCA, CORRUPT
PRACTICES LEGISLATION (1928); EARL RAY SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES
LEGISLATION (1928); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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rationalization, the architects of modern progressive administration were
adamant and explicit that their radical innovations were in the larger service
of democracy. The original democratic ethos that animated the eﬀorts of
reformers to re-invent public administration and administrative law at the
turn of the century was very much part of the creation of a more modern
American state capable of eﬀectively recognizing and serving the needs of a
democratic public.
In his essay Democracy and Educational Administration, John Dewey was
most explicit about the democratic aspirations of administrative reform.
There he reiterated the new democratic principles that democracy was “much
broader than a special political form” or “a method of conducting
government.”112 It involved that, surely, but for Dewey the key was the larger
democratic “ends” that lie in the development of each and every “human
personality”—the “way of life, social and individual,” that included the
“participation of every mature human being” in the formation of the values,
rules, and social institutions that regulated collective life.113 To view the public
solely in terms of electoral means and to exclude it from actual participation
in the governmental determination of public ends was but a “form of coercion
and suppression . . . more subtle and more eﬀective than . . . overt
intimidation and restraint.”114 Aristocracy was “blasphemy against
personality”115—for “[e]very autocratic and authoritarian scheme of social
action rests on a belief that the needed intelligence is conﬁned to a superior
few . . . .”116 Dewey volubly resisted any such anti-democratic tendency in
administration whether educational, national, or municipal. A single fact
ﬁxed Dewey’s conception of distinctly democratic administration: “It cannot
be conceived as a sectarian or racial thing nor as a consecration of some form
of government which has already attained constitutional sanction.”117 Rather,
democracy was but “a name for the fact that human nature is developed only
when its elements take part in directing things which are common.”118 As he

112 JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Educational Administration, in PROBLEMS OF MEN 57, 57
(1946). See also id. at 64 (adding that the distinctive traits of “autocratic government” were “the least
public spirit and the greatest indiﬀerence to matters of general as distinct from personal concern”).
113 Id. at 57-58.
114 Id. at 59.
115 JOHN DEWEY, THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY 25 (1888).
116 DEWEY, supra note 112 at 59.
117 JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 209 (1920).
118 Id.; see also ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM
25 (1995) (articulating the democratic diﬀerence between John Dewey’s conception of administration
and Walter Lippmann’s: “Dewey had a ﬁrmer grasp of reality than Lippmann . . . . [H]e was deeply,
almost congenitally opposed to the elitism that Lippmann’s proposals embodied . . . . [T]he problem
was to make democrac[tic society] . . . both a greater unity and one that reﬂected the full diversity
of its members’ talents and aptitudes.”).

2019]

The Progressive Idea of Democratic Administration

1847

elaborated in The Public and Its Problems, the two key ingredients of modern
democratic statecraft were: 1) the organization and active participation of the
public; and 2) the proper organization of oﬃcials and institutions so as to
secure those distinctly public rather than personal interests.119
CONCLUSION
In 1930, Felix Frankfurter opened the timely topic of “Expert
Administration and Democracy” in The Public and Its Government with a
prescient one-two punch: “Epitaphs for democracy are the fashion of the day
. . . . But it is simply not true that the area of democratic government has
contracted.”120 As scholars and intellectuals have attempted to come to terms
with the extraordinary growth of the modern American administrative state,
they have most often worked with the highly visible and theorized themes of
bureaucracy, technocracy, science, management, and expertise. And more
frequently than not, the tendency has been to view those governmental
changes as one-dimensional and fundamentally at odds with democratic
governance as in Democracy vs. Administration or Man vs. the State. Just as
frequently, scholars have proﬀered solutions to the “problem of
administration” by invoking some kind of intermediating, moderating
inﬂuence, such as the rule of law, an ancient or original constitution, civil
society, the public sphere, social movements, or the market. But historically,
we should not forget that the main impulse behind modern American
administration was political not teleological or inevitable. The turn to
contingent administrative solutions–-as John Dewey, Jane Addams, Charles
Francis Adams, and Charles Beard constantly reminded us—was part of a
broader political-economic struggle and a social contest in favor of more
democracy—a new democracy. Reformers witnessed traditional democratic
procedures at the national, state, and municipal level too easily manipulated
by urban machines, state legislative politicos, and resurgent economic and
industrial interests so as to corruptly turn the res publica to private service.
The administrative state was not emblematic of a “crisis in democracy,” it was
the new democratic response. After all, the modern American administrative
state was not created for its own sake–-for the self-satisfaction of a
professional class of technocratic statebuilders. Rather, like the creation of a
modern constitution (which was also the product of intense political struggle
and contest), the modern American state was created for the service of larger
119 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 208 (Alan Swallow ed., 1954) (1927). For
an excellent application of the architecture of this particular text to the problem of democracy and
administration, see Note, Deweyan Democracy and the Administrative State, 125 HARV. L. REV. 580,
588 (2011).
120 FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 123.
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public and human ends. Woodrow Wilson’s “New Meaning of Government”
was but a ﬁrst step on the road to the kind of public and social serviceoriented state endorsed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935:
[T]o increase the security and happiness of a larger number of people in all
occupations of life and in all parts of the country; to give them more of the
good things of life; to give them a greater distribution not only of wealth in
the narrow terms but of wealth in the wider terms; to give them places to go
in the Summertime—recreation; to give them assurance that they are not
going to starve in their old age; to give honest business a chance to go ahead
and make a reasonable proﬁt; and to give everyone a chance to earn a living.121

As Roosevelt saw it, the administrative reforms of the New Deal were part
of this new democratic tradition: “we have made the exercise of all power
more democratic; for we have begun to bring private autocratic powers into
their proper subordination to the public’s government.”122

121 Jobs, Security and Chance for Business Restated by Roosevelt as Social Aims, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
1935, at 1.
122 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, (Jan. 20, 1937), in S. DOC. NO.
10 (1937), at 2.

